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Recent Developments 
Kassama v. Magat: 
Maryland Does Not Recognize a Child-Plaintiff's Tort Law Cause of 
Action for "Wrongful Life" 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held the State of 
Maryland does not recognize a child-
plaintiff's tort law cause of action for 
"wrongful life." Kassama v. Magat, 
368 Md. 113, 148, 792 A.2d 1102, 
1123 (2002). The court further held 
the trial judge did not err in submitting 
the issue of the mother's contributory 
negligence to the jury, or in refusing 
her request for a "last clear chance" 
jury instruction. Id. at 127-33, 792 
A.2d at 1111-14. 
Millicent Kassama (''Kassama'') 
learned she was pregnant with !brion 
Kassama ("Ibrion") in February, 
1995. She was referred by her 
primary care physician to respondent, 
Aaron Magat ("Dr. Magat") for 
obstetrical care. Dr. Magat first 
examined Kassama on April 19 and 
estimated that Ibrion was 
approximately seventeen weeks, and 
five days old. Noting she came to his 
office late in her pregnancy, Dr. Magat 
referred Kassama for standard 
obstetrical laboratory testing the very 
next day. These tests included an 
alpha-fetaprotein test ("AFP test"), 
which served as a screening device 
for certain fetal disorders. Kassama 
neglected to have the AFP test 
performed until May 16. Dr. Magat 
did not receive the results until May 
25, when Kassama was twenty-two 
weeks and four days pregnant. The 
AFP test results indicated a 
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significantly elevated risk that her child 
had Down's Syndrome. Standard 
medical procedure required the 
mother to promptly undergo 
amniocentesis to identify whether the 
child had Down's Syndrome. The test 
results, however, would not have been 
available for two weeks, at which time 
Kassama would have been over 
twenty-four weeks pregnant and 
unable to terminate the pregnancy in 
Maryland. 
!brion was born with Down's 
Syndrome, and Kassama filed a 
complaint in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County on behalf ofherself 
and the child. Only Kassama's 
negligence claim was submitted to the 
jury, which found, in a special verdict, 
Dr. Magatwas negligent and Kassama 
was contributorily negligent Kassama 
appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed 
the trial court. The court of appeals 
granted certiorari to consider 
petitioner's claims that the trial judge 
erred in giving a contributory 
negligence jury instruction, in failing to 
instruct the jury on the doctrine oflast 
clear chance, and in dismissing 
!brion's ''wrongful life" claim against 
Dr. Magat. 
The court first considered 
Kassama's claim that Dr. Magat's 
negligence precluded a finding of any 
negligence on her part, and 
consequently, that the contributory 
negligence instruction should not have 
been given to the jury. Id. at 127-28, 
792 A.2d at 1110-11. The court 
found Kassama's argument rested on 
the erroneous assumption that the jury 
returned a specific finding of 
negligence on the part ofboth parties, 
when the jury's findings were general. 
Id. at 129, 792 A.2d at 1111. The 
jury did not specify what conduct by 
Dr. Magat or Kassama it considered 
negligent, and there were a number 
of possibilities that would have 
allowed a consistent finding of 
primaI)' and contributory negligence. 
Id. at 130-31, 792A.2d at 1112-13. 
Further holding there was sufficient 
evidence to warrant such an 
instruction, the comt affirmed the trial 
court. Id. at 131, 792 A.2d at 1113. 
The court next examined 
Kassama's contention that the trial 
judge erred in denying her requested 
jury instruction on the doctrine of 
"last clear chance." Kassama, 368 
Md. at 132, 792 A.2d at 1113 
(2002). Kassama claimed even if the 
jury could have found her 
contributorily negligent, Magat still 
had the last clear chance to avert the 
injury "by advising her of the 
abnormal result, to obtain 
amniocentesis, and allow her to 
terminate the pregnancy." Id. at 132, 
792 A.2d at 1113. Again, the court 
heldKassama'sargumentmistaken1y 
depended on specific findings of 
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negligence by the jury when its actual 
findings were only general. Id. at 133, 
792 A.2d at 1114. The court affinned 
the decision of the court of special 
appeals, finding "there was a 
smorgasbord of possibilities [here] 
and, as to most of them, the instruction 
requested by petitioner was 
inapplicable." Id. at 133, 792 A.2d 
at 1114. 
Finally, the court turned its 
attention to the claim for "wrongful 
life" brought on behalf ofIbrion. Id. 
at 133, 792 A.2d at 1114. The 
Arizona Supreme Court distinguished 
''wrongful life" claims from other tort 
law claims arising from the birth of a 
child. Id. at 136, 792 A.2d at 1116 
(citing Walker v. Pizano v. Mart, 
790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990)). These 
claims were brought by children, not 
parents, for alleged injuries caused by 
children being born rather than 
aborted. Kassama, 368 Md. at 136, 
792 A.2d at 1116 (2002). Thus, in 
the instant case, the injury claimed by 
Ibrion was not caused by Dr. Magat, 
but resulted from being allowed to live 
"the injury oflife itself." Id. at 136, 
792 A.2d at 1116. 
The court recognized twenty-
eight states currently deny recovery 
for these actions, while only three 
provide for a limited recovery. Id. at 
137-38,792 A.2d at 1116-17. 
Among the first to address this issue 
was the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 
689 (N.J. 1967), holding such claims 
required courts to measure the 
difference between "life with defects 
against the utter void of non-
existence," and that such a 
determination "is impossible to make." 
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Id. at 139, 792A.2d at 1117 (quoting 
Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692). The 
vast majority of courts have been 
unwilling to accept that impaired life 
is worse than non-life, and have 
rejected the "wrongful life" cause of 
action on the ground that a child's life 
cannot be a legally cognizable injury. 
Id. at 141, 227 A.2d at 1119. Even 
in the three states recognizing a 
limited recovery for such claims, 
recovery is limited to "the 
extraordinary expenses of dealing with 
the impairment," and awards of 
general damages are denied. Id. at 
144, 792 A.2d at 1121 (2002). 
Therefore, the court of appeals held 
"for purposes of tort law, an impaired 
life is not worse than non-life, and, 
for that reason, life is not, and cannot 
be, an injury." Kassama, 368 Md. at 
148, 792 A.2d at 1123 (2002) 
(emphasis in original). 
In Kassama v. Magat, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland aligned 
itself with the vast majority of states 
refusing to recognize a child-plaintiff'S 
cause of action for "wrongful life. " A 
finding that an injury has occurred in 
such a case requires a detennination 
that non-life is preferable to living with 
an impairment, such as Down's 
Syndrome. While other jurisdictions 
maintain such a detennination is 
beyond the scope of the judiciary, the 
court of appeals went a step further 
by adopting an impaired life is not 
worse than non-life. The court's 
decision is likely to have far-reaching 
implications on Maryland medical 
malpractice litigation, as it precludes 
a child-plaintiff from claiming a 
number of possible causes of action 
stemming from a doctor's negligence. 
Life itself cannot be a cognizable injury 
in the State of Maryland; thus, a cause 
of action for ''wrongful life" does not 
exist 
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